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The following is my response to e-mail question May 30, 2000: Why are major corporations such as Boeing not involved in the Skycar?
For many years Dr. Moller appeared to fear that partnering with a major corporation would result in his losing control, and that the Skycar would not become the good product/service that it had the potential to be.
During the 90's Dr. Moller took a different attitude and somewhat actively looked for potential Skycar partnerships. There were several interested corporations, all of which were all outside of the US, but no agreements were reached I know little of these details.
I do, however, know the details of the attempts to work with Boeing, being the spearhead of the effort.
By the late 1990’s there are over 1,000 Boeing employees who are aware of the Moller Skycar and believe that it is a promising opportunity. However, these people do not make the Boeing product decisions.
Twice during the 90's I brought the concept of the Skycar to upper Boeing management.
1) In 1991 I bypassed the chain of command with the results of my own research in "Preliminary Design Group". The goal of 100 people in the group was to determine which markets Boeing should be involved in 5 to 15 years in the future. No only did upper management turn down the concept, but I was kicked out of the group within 1 month. By the way: while in the group I proposed a total of 5 projects, none of which were accepted by Boeing. None of the proposed products were then commercially being developed. I ham happy to say that four of my five proposals are now commercial products, but unfortunately, not in Boeing. The Skycar will be the last of my five 1991 proposals to become commercially developed.
2) In 1995 I tried again. I had other Boeing groups assess the potential of the Skycar. Both Engineering and Marketing groups in Boeing Commercial looked at the Skycar and both found the design and the market to be good. I again approached upper management. Again not thru channels. (I had tried going thru channels, but it did not go more than 2 of the 7 levels needed) The VP who I presented it to this time felt that Boeing should have no interest in aircraft carrying fewer that 100 passengers.
That VP had been in charge of the development of 2 large aircraft programs in Boeing and had seen the poor results of Boeing becoming in small aircraft in Canada during the previous 10 years. Not only did he reject Boeing becoming interested in the Skycar, but also I believe that he was the reason that I was forced out of Boeing 6 weeks later.
Management is rewarded when they avoid any kind of risk, but management evolves in companies such as Boeing. That VP has since retired and I rejoined Boeing 4 months later. Boeing is now far hungrier for new concepts and projects than it had been in 1991 or 1995. I will be trying one last time (during the next 12 months) to get upper Boeing management interested in what a NASA chief scientist refers to as a $1 trillion a year market.